Trustworthiness and economic performance by Breuer, Janice Boucher & McDermott, John
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Trustworthiness and economic
performance
Janice Boucher Breuer and John McDermott
University of South Carolina, University of South Carolina
March 2009
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24486/
MPRA Paper No. 24486, posted 19. August 2010 00:57 UTC
Trustworthiness and Economic Performance
Janice Boucher Breuer and John McDermott∗
August 16, 2010
Department of Economics, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208
Abstract
Trustworthiness is the foundation for trust, institutions, and per capita
output in society. Trustworthiness is primary – a society’s willingness to trust
and the quality of its institutions have their origins in the trustworthiness of
its citizens. Trustworthiness is therefore the basis for maximizing output in
economic exchange and in explaining differences in standards of living around
the world. We measure trustworthiness with a question from the World Values
Survey and estimate its effect using a sample of 60 countries. We find that
trustworthiness is important for output per capita and that any effect of trust
is likely to come from trustworthiness. Our results are robust to alternative
specifications.
(JEL codes: O10, O40, O43, Z1)
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Surprisingly much of the literature on trust hardly mentions trustworthi-
ness, even though much of it is primarily about trustworthiness, not trust.
Hardin (1992).
1 Introduction
Trustworthy behavior is an important determinant of economic outcomes. If people
are not trustworthy, a general lack of trust is inevitable, and exchange, specialization,
and production suffer. The effect of trust on economic performance has been studied
extensively and the results point consistently to a strong, positive correlation between
the two. Much less empirical work has been done on trustworthiness. One reason
for this may be the perception that there is no real difference between trust and
trustworthiness: you cannot have one without the other, this argument goes, so it
does not matter which is used as an explanatory variable. Another reason may be
the lack of an obvious measure for trustworthiness. We address these issues below
and test the primacy of trustworthiness on economic performance.
Our framework, which provides the structure for our empirical tests, contains four
elements: (1) the nature of trustworthiness; (2) the endogeneity of trust; (3) the
source of good institutions; and (4) the role of trust and trustworthiness in generat-
ing output. Trustworthy individuals are one of two types: intrinsically trustworthy
or conditionally trustworthy. Intrinsically trustworthy individuals always behave so,
regardless of incentives whereas the conditionally trustworthy behave honestly when
it is in their self-interest. We believe intrinsic trustworthiness comes from deep-seated
values that are related to culture while conditional trustworthiness comes from insti-
tutions. In either case, when there is more trustworthy behavior, individuals have
greater reason to trust. This is the second element of our framework. Trust is en-
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dogenous and can only exist in an environment of trustworthiness. The third element
asserts that the proportion of the intrinsically trustworthy is also the source of good
institutions in a country. Good institutions establish fair and efficient mechanisms
to punish cheating and encourage rational individuals to act in a trustworthy man-
ner. The higher the quality of the institutions, the greater the proportion of the
conditionally trustworthy. Finally, trust and trustworthiness are equally important
in generating output. Trust is necessary to initiate transactions and trustworthiness
is critical for the realization of production.
To date, the empirical literature in economics has focused on trust and its effect
on economic growth. In this literature, trusting behavior is said to generate coop-
eration, discourage diversion, and encourage civic engagement, which can enhance
output. Knack and Keefer (1997), Zak and Knack (2001), Tabellini (2008), Temple
and Johnson (1998), and Hall and Jones (1999) are all influential examples of this
literature.1
Many authors recognize that trustworthiness is important, yet there has been
virtually no cross-country empirical work that deals with it in a rigorous way. We
address this gap by introducing a measure of intrinsic trustworthiness and testing our
ideas. Like the usual measure for trust, our measure of trustworthiness comes from
the World Values Survey (2006). The measure is based on a question that elicits from
parents their subjective view of the importance of teaching children tolerance and
respect for others.
To preview our results, we find that using a sample of 60 countries, trustworthiness
consistently performs well in explaining per capita output. The inclusion of control
variables changes the magnitude, but not the significance of trustworthiness. More-
1See Coleman (1988), Putnam (1993), La Porta et al. (1997), and others who consider the effects
of trust in organizations and social groups. Guiso et al. (2005) show that trust is related to culture,
and that low trust between countries results in low levels of trade and capital flows.
3
over, trustworthiness consistently outperforms trust in our regressions. At first, we
maintain the hypothesis that trustworthiness is exogenous. Later, we allow it to be
endogenous and use four different instruments to control for endogeneity. In almost
all of the cases, trustworthiness has a significant, first-order impact on per capita
income. We also show that intrinsic trustworthiness is important to the formation of
high quality institutions and trust.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section sets out our analytical frame-
work in more detail. This is not a rigorous theoretical model, but rather a guiding
structure to help understand the logic of the empirical tests. In Section 3, we describe
the data and the sample of countries that we use. Section 4 presents our econometric
specifications and results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Framework
2.1 Trustworthiness
We make an important distinction between intrinsic trustworthiness and conditional
trustworthiness. Intrinsic trustworthiness is unconditional; regardless of the costs of
behaving trustworthily, an individual who is intrinsically trustworthy, will always act
so. The existence of individuals who are intrinsically trustworthy has been assumed in
the game-theoretic work of Frank (1987), Harrington (1989), Huang and Wu (1994),
and Bohnet et al. (2001) in a similar context. Sen (1977) also assumes there are
individuals who are willing to take action that conflicts with self-interest (a type he
calls “committed”). In his study of rotating credit institutions in Peru, Karlan (2005)
conjectures that some of the respondents may have been innately trustworthy. In
contrast, conditional trustworthiness is trustworthy behavior that is conditional on
the costs and benefits to behaving trustworthily.
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We define the fraction of people who behave trustworthily to be pTW :
pTW = rTW + vTW < 1 (1)
where rTW is the fraction of people in the economy who are intrinsically trustworthy
and vTW is the fraction who are conditionally trustworthy.
In our view, economies are endowed with a level of intrinsic trustworthiness, but
conditional trustworthiness is generated by good institutions. Countries with good
legal and economic institutions prompt people to behave as if they were naturally
trustworthy. Institutions elicit honest behavior through threat of punishment or so-
cial pressure. Where institutions are good at suppressing cheating, they induce the
conditionally trustworthy to behave honestly.2 We express this relationship as follows:
vTW = V (I) (2)
where I stands for institutional quality.
2.2 Trust
In his book Trust, Fukuyama (1995) states that trust is “the expectation that arises
within a community of regular, honest, and cooperative behavior, based on commonly
shared norms, on the part of the members of that community.” Gambetta (1988)
defines trust as “a particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent
assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action.” Fehr
(2008) states that trust arises from beliefs about trustworthiness and preferences
2The link between institutions and trust has been prominent in the work of Putnam (1993),
Coleman (1988), Beugelsdijk (2006), and Huck (1998), among others. There is, on the other hand, a
strand of the game-theory literature that examines how cooperative behavior can evolve without the
intervention of government institutions. See Axelrod (1984), Ellison (1994), Huang and Wu (1994),
and Kandori (1992).
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toward risk.
For each of these, trust is equated with an expectation about behavior. More im-
portantly, these definitions point out that the trustworthiness of the party on the other
end of the transaction is critical. The trust that we observe is due to the existence
of trustworthy agents, whether intrinsic or induced by institutions. It is irrational to
trust others in an environment of dishonest agents. We write this relationship as:
pT = T (pTW ) (3)
where pT is the proportion of individuals who trust and pTW is defined in (1). In
countries with more trustworthy behavior, trust itself is higher. In this environment,
trust ultimately depends on the expectation of being cheated, which in turn depends
on the fraction of the population that does not cheat.
2.3 Institutions
If everyone were intrinsically trustworthy, there would be no need for institutions.
No one would cheat and agents would soon learn to trust everyone. Unfortunately,
this is never the case. We assume good institutions come fundamentally from rTW ,
the fraction of intrinsically trustworthy people in society. Our reasoning has two
elements. First, the intrinsically trustworthy fundamentally embrace a respect for
others in society. They value the security of property and rule of law as devices
to protect not only their own freedom, but that of others, too. Good institutions
may be seen as commitment mechanisms designed to ensure individual freedoms and
the protection of property rights over time. They increase the probability of catching
cheaters and increase the penalty if a cheater is caught. Second, the larger the share of
intrinsically trustworthy agents in the general population, the more votes are secured
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that establish institutions that effectively punish cheaters with high probability. Thus,
we hypothesize that institutional quality depends positively on rTW :
I = I(rTW ) (4)
2.4 Production
We outline a simple story of exchange to illustrate how trust and trustworthiness
matter for aggregate output. First, we assume that individuals extend trust to others
to produce output. If they do not trust, no output is produced. Counterparties can
be two types – intrinsically trustworthy or conditionally trustworthy. Intrinsically
trustworthy types participate honestly in the production of output. The conditionally
trustworthy may behave dishonestly. When trust is met with trustworthy behavior,
maximum output - which we call ym - is produced. If not, output yl is produced
where yl = δym and 0 < δ < 1.
There are N individuals who meet others over the course of the year; in the limit,
assume each person encounters every other person. Under this scheme, there would
be M = N (N − 1) meetings every year.3 Aggregate output, Y would then be:
Y = pTpTWMym + pT (1− pTW )Myl (5)
As (5) shows, aggregate output depends on the proportions of people who trust (pT )
and can be trusted (pTW ).
It is useful to write per capita output y = Y
N
as follows:
3In our model, agents do not play a game: types are determined prior to the current period,
but no one knows the type of the person on the other side of the transaction. The payoff matrix,
however, is similar to the Trust-Honor variant of the prisoner’s dilemma game in Bohnet et al. (2001)
and Berg et al. (1995), among many others.
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y =
(
1 + δ
(1− pTW )
pTW
)
pTpTW ym (N − 1) (6)
where δ = yl
ym
is the relative shortfall of output when people are not trustworthy. We
observe from (6) that living standards rise with both the fraction of people who are
trusting pT and the fraction who act honestly pTW .
The ideas in this section constitute a framework designed to highlight the im-
portance of trust and trustworthy behavior to standards of living. We now turn to
a discussion of the data that we use to test the importance of trustworthiness in
economic performance.
3 Data and Country Sample
Construction of our sample was guided by several considerations. First, we use the
question on trust from the World Values Survey (2006) that has been used frequently
in previous research.4 This question is A165 and is available in Wave 1 (1981), Wave
2 (1990), Wave 3 (1995), and Wave 4 (2000) of the survey. The question reads:
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or
that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?”
1. Most people can be trusted
2. Can’t be too careful
The question has been used by many authors in a wide variety of disciplines.
4The World Values Survey, initiated in 1981 as a companion of the European Values Survey and
the General Social Survey, contains thousands of questions on topics ranging from “Perceptions of
Life” to “Religion and Morale”, with useful sociodemographic information. Between 1,000 and 2,000
people are interviewed in each country in each wave. The World Values Survey is downloadable
from wvs http://www.worldvaluessurvey.com/services/index.html.
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We measure the fraction of those who trust in a country pT using affirmative
response rates (Answer 1) to the question. An affirmative answer seems to reflect, at
least in part, people’s confidence in not being cheated. There is no way to tell if people
are answering that “most people can be trusted” because they believe in the innate
goodness of others (i.e. the respondent views others as intrinsically trustworthy) or
because they have faith that institutions will discourage untrustworthy types from
cheating them (i.e. institutions have induced the respondent to be trusting).
To measure intrinsic trustworthiness rTW we use responses to question A035 from
the World Values Survey.5 Question A035 is part of a series of questions that asks
respondents to select up to five qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at
home. In Waves 3 and 4 of the World Values Survey, respondents were given a list
of ten qualities. These include good manners, independence, hard work, feelings of
responsibility, thrift, determination and perseverance, religious faith, unselfishness,
obedience, and tolerance and respect for others. The qualities listed across each wave
vary to some degree, but question A035 appears in all four waves.6 Each question
begins with:
“Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at
home. Which if any do you consider to be especially important? Please
choose up to five. CODE FIVE ONLY.”
Each question in the series is then followed by just one “quality”, e.g independence,
thrift, etc. Those who chose “tolerance and respect for others” we consider to be
5We considered several other questions – a question on honesty (A031) and a question on lying
(F127) used by Slemrod and Katusca´k (2005). A031 was only asked in the 1981 survey and F127 only
in the 1990 survey. We also considered questions that Knack and Keefer (1997) used to construct a
measure of civic norms (which they mention may be associated with trustworthiness). We did not
use these questions because they are situational and there may be a wide range of circumstances
that respondents consider when answering.
6We are aware of only one other paper that uses this question. Tabellini (2008) includes it in his
cultural index.
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intrinsically trustworthy. Individuals who value tolerance and respect for others are
more likely to be trustworthy. One cannot respect others and at the same time treat
them dishonestly. This question, we believe, elicits the true character of the parent,
not the child. Respondents who feel it important to teach their children tolerance
and respect for others, in our view, do so because they themselves possess these basic
qualities.
Because survey respondents are asked to select five questions from a list of 10
qualities, there is an opportunity cost to selecting any question. We think that this
cost elicits a true response. If, for example, the question were framed as the direct “do
you think it is important to teach your children tolerance and respect for a others?”
then people might respond “yes” even if they did not really value it. Unlike responses
to the trust question, we assume that our measure of trustworthiness does not include
a component that may be induced by institutions. Our maintained hypothesis is that
conditionally trustworthy types do not code “tolerance and respect for others” based
on the legal or social ramifications. In other words, we think that Question A035
measures rTW and not pTW .
For each country, we tabulate the percentage of total respondents who answered
“most people can be trusted” to question A165 and those who selected “tolerance and
respect for others” to question A035. These percentages correspond to pT and rTW .
There is a fair amount of variation in our data. For example, pT and rTW are 36%
and 80% for the United States, but only 3% and 60% for Brazil. The first two lines
of Table 1 show that overall the fraction of people who are trusting is significantly
smaller than the number who are intrinsically trustworthy. These differences could
be due to differences in the quality of institutions or social preferences.7
7It is also possible that the trust question from the World Values Survey does not measure trust,
per se, but rather caution (Miller and Mitamura (2003)) or institutions (Beugelsdijk (2006)).
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Table 1: Descriptive Data
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
pT 0.298 0.163 0.028 0.665
rTW 0.708 0.099 0.525 0.923
yj
yUS
0.416 0.276 0.031 1.0
Y ears Schoolingj
Y ears SchoolingUS
0.627 0.204 0.20 1.0
Property Rights 3.70 1.021 1 5
In constructing our data set from the World Values Survey, we decided to exclude
Waves 1 and 2 from the analysis because these waves are heavily weighted with
Western European and advanced economies and provide substantially less variation.
Instead, we combined the countries from Waves 3 and 4 but eliminated duplicates;
we only used data from Wave 3 if there is no data from Wave 4 for that country.8
We also use data on GDP per capita (y) in purchasing power parity dollars from
the Penn World Table (v. 6.2); years of schooling in the population aged 25 or older
from Barro and Lee (2001) for human capital (H) which will be later used as a control
variable in estimating an equation for y ; and the index of security of property rights
from the Heritage Foundation, as a proxy for institutions (I). A higher value implies
better institutions (we recoded property rights to make it conform to this rule).
The combined data yields a base set of observations for 60 countries. Country
coverage includes developed, developing, emerging, and transition economies.9 Table
8As a robustness check, we ran all of our main results using the opposite rule: discarding the data
for Wave 4 if there were duplicates. The results were virtually unchanged in terms of the significance
of the key coefficients.
9The countries is our sample are the following: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Dominican Republic, Egypt, Arab Rep., El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Rep., Malta, Mex-
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1 gives the basic descriptive statistics. We present the data for y, and Years Schooling
relative to the United States. Property Rights is based on a scale running from 1 to
5, with an average of 3.75.
4 Estimation
4.1 A Basic OLS Model
A log-linear model for output per capita that captures the basics of (6) may be
specified as:
ln yj = α0 + α1 ln pT,j + α2 ln pTW,j + α3 lnHj + µj (7)
where we include human capital Hj as a control variable to proxy for ym.
We cannot estimate the relationship in (7) however, because we do not have a
measure of trustworthy behavior pTW . We noted in (1) that pTW is equal to the sum
of the natively trustworthy rTW and the conditionally trustworthy vTW . Using (1)
and (2), we can replace pTW in (7) to get our first estimating equation:
ln yj = β0 + β1 ln pT,j + β2 ln rTW,j + β3Ij + β4 lnHj + j (8)
Our initial strategy is to estimate Equation (8) with OLS. This is primarily a
benchmarking exercise, since it is likely that the regressors – with the possible excep-
tion of rTW – are correlated with the error  in our cross section data set.
Table 2 presents the results from estimating variants of (8). The first two columns
show the results when the logs of pT and rTW are included one at a time, with no
other regressors. Both are quite significant while trustworthiness has a much larger
ico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovak Rep., Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Taiwan (China), Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zimbabwe
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Table 2: Basic OLS
Dependent variable: ln y
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
lnTrust (ln pT )
0.53**
[0.00]
0.28
[0.13]
0.16
[0.21]
0.1
[0.46]
lnTrustworthiness
(ln rTW )
3.25**
[0.00]
2.74**
[0.00]
1.00**
[0.01]
0.84*
[0.04]
Property Rights
Index
0.38**
[0.00]
0.36**
[0.00]
0.36**
[0.00]
ln Schooling
0.92**
[0.00]
0.87**
[0.00]
0.84**
[0.00]
Constant 10.00** 10.42** 10.62** 6.26** 6.56** 6.69**
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Observations 60 60 60 57 57 57
Adj R2 0.14 0.27 0.29 0.74 0.75 0.75
Notes : Robust p values in brackets. **significant 1%; * at 5%; + at 10%
coefficient than trust. The third column shows the results when we put the two
together. In this case, only trustworthiness is significant.
The last three columns add Property Rights for I and Years of Schooling for H,
but otherwise repeat the first three columns.10 Trustworthiness remains significant,
although the magnitude of its coefficient falls appreciably. Trust, on the other hand
is not significant in any specification. Property Rights and Schooling are also highly
significant and the highest adjusted R2 is 75%.
In sum, the results of Table 2 show a much stronger correlation between trustwor-
thiness and output per capita than between trust and output per capita.
10Our sample size decreases by three when we add Property Rights.
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4.2 A Reduced-form Model
Our main interest is in exploring the relationship between trustworthiness and output
per capita. However, equation (8) and the results in Table 2 may suffer from endo-
geneity bias. We are concerned that pT and I may be correlated with the error .
One way around the endogeneity problem is to estimate our system in reduced form.
We continue to maintain that rTW is exogenous.
Consider institutions I. As emphasized by Acemoglu et al. (2001), rich countries
may prefer better institutions. Or, there may be a bias in the subjective construction
of the property rights index, such that evaluators see better institutions in richer
economies. Finally, measurement error may be particularly acute in studies like these.
Thus, I may be correlated with the error in (8).
Our measure of trust pT is also likely to be correlated with the error. As argued
earlier – see equation (3) – trustworthy behavior pTW , whether intrinsic rTW or condi-
tional vTW , determines trust pT . It does so because we believe that trust is impossible
without the expectation that the other party is likely to be trustworthy. Based on
(1), (2), and (3), we see that pT is correlated with institutions. Therefore, if I is
correlated with the error in (8), so will be pT .
Next, we assume that human capital depends on rTW . Glaeser et al. (2004) argue
that human capital H may be more deeply rooted and persistent than some of the
measures that are used to represent high quality governmental institutions. Since
intrinsically trustworthy types respect the rights and freedoms of others, it is natural
to hypothesize that they will also promote and expand educational opportunities. We
express this as:
H = H(rTW ) (9)
This is consistent with the ideas of Acemoglu et al. (2005) who hypothesize that
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both education and institutions (in their case, democracy) are determined by a third,
common variable. For us, that variable is intrinsic trustworthiness.
A reduced-form equation of our initial estimating equation (8) in which y depends
only on intrinsic trustworthiness rTW can be obtained by using the four structural
relations (2), (3), (4) and (9), along with the identity (1). Accordingly, we estimate
the following reduced form:
ln yj = γ0 + γ1 ln rTWj + ϑj (10)
We estimate this equation using OLS. The results are shown in Table 3.
The first column repeats Column 2 of Table 2. The rest of the table adds regional
or income indicator variables to see if we are inadvertently picking up the influence
of a some third effect that is correlated with both y and rTW . The second column of
Table 3 adds indicator variables for Sub-Saharan Africa (SBSA), East Asia and the
Pacific, (EAP ) and Latin America and Caribbean (LAC). Trustworthiness contin-
ues to be significant and the African and Latin American indicators are significantly
negative, but there is no explanatory power from the EAP indicator. Column 3 uses
indicators from the World Bank for low-income countries (LID) and high-income
countries (HID). Trustworthiness retains significance (although the magnitude falls)
and both of these indicators are significant with the expected signs. Column 4 re-
peats the exercise with a single dummy for OECD countries. The results are similar:
trustworthiness is significant and so is the indicator. The adjusted R2 reaches 85%
for the third specification.
The last two columns divide the sample into countries with income above the sam-
ple median, and those with income below it. In the above-median group, trustworthi-
ness continues to be very significant. In the last column, we see that trustworthiness
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Table 3: Reduced-form OLS
Dependent variable: ln y
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full
Sample
Full
Sample
Full
Sample
Full
Sample
y ≥
ymed
y <
ymed
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
lnTrustworthiness
(ln rTW )
3.25**
[0.00]
2.91**
[0.00]
0.80*
[0.02]
1.20+
[0.05]
1.09**
[0.00]
0.9
[0.37]
SBSA
-1.37**
[0.00]
EAP
-0.58
[0.16]
LAC
-0.58**
[0.00]
LID
-1.07**
[0.00]
HID
1.17**
[0.00]
OECD
1.11**
[0.00]
Constant
10.42**
[0.00]
10.50**
[0.00]
9.09**
[0.00]
9.26**
[0.00]
10.31**
[0.00]
8.91**
[0.00]
Observations 60 60 60 60 30 30
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.42 0.85 0.56 0.3 0.03
Notes: Robust p values in brackets. **significant 1%; * at 5%; + at 10%
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is not significant for the below-median income group. The mean trustworthiness for
this group is only 66% as compared to 75% for the higher income group. As we
expect, trust is also lower on average (23% compared to 36%).11
4.3 Instrumental Variables
To this point we have maintained the hypothesis that our measure of intrinsic trust-
worthiness rTW is exogenous. Recall that rTW measures the proportion of the pop-
ulation of the country that identifies “tolerance and respect for others” in the World
Values Survey to be an important quality to teach their children. We claimed that
this proportion corresponds to a deep-seated character trait and does not depend on
income or institutions.
There are reasons, however, that some may be concerned about our exogeneity
assumption. First, it is possible that we are measuring intrinsic trustworthiness with
error. Second, since our measure of intrinsic trustworthiness is based on a survey, it
is possible that survey bias has occurred. Third, it may be possible that rTW and
y evolve together over time from the influence of common, unobserved variables. A
fourth possibility is that rTW is more dependent on current y than we have assumed
– it is possible that rTW may be higher because y is higher. If any of these are true,
our measure of intrinsic trustworthiness rTW is correlated with the error ϑ in (10),
then the coefficient of interest γ1 is biased.
To correct for any potential endogeneity, we instrument for rTW . We consider
four different instruments: two past values of “Constraint on the Executive” (lags of
50 and 100 years) from the Polity IV database, which we label ConstraintExec 50
and ConstraintExec 100; the variable Latitude, which is the absolute value of the
11The units for income per capita are International dollars of 2000, as reported in the Penn World
Table (Heston et al., 2006).
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country’s latitude measured as a fraction of 90 degrees; and Mortality, which is
the measure of potential European settler mortality from Acemoglu et al. (2001).
Constraint on the Executive has been used by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) and
others as a measure of the quality of institutions.
We consider the first two to be measures of the quality of early institutions, which
we think are highly correlated with early intrinsic trustworthiness. It is likely that
the value of rTW in the past – not the present – is the key to institution formation.
Since we do not have data on historical values of rTW , we assume that today’s value
of rTW for which we do have data, is highly correlated with past values of I.
Latitude has been used by Hall and Jones (1999) and Glaeser et al. (2004) among
others to instrument for current institutions. Hall and Jones use it as a measure
of Western European influence on the set-up and subsequent development of social
infrastructure. The idea is that higher latitudes were both sparsely populated and
similar in climate to Western Europe itself, both of which encouraged settlement and
colonization by Europeans who brought their institutions with them.
We extend the argument to distinguish between types of settlers: we conjecture
that more trustworthy Europeans migrated to higher latitudes because the difficult
working conditions and the small size of settlements made life unattractive for dis-
honest agents. Small settlement size, for example, made detection of transgressions
easier. The lack of large-scale extractive industries – which were found mainly at low
latitudes – made it more difficult to find profitable opportunities to take advantage
of native peoples or other settlers.
Settler mortality was introduced by Acemoglu et al. (2001) as an instrument for
current institutions. The idea is similar: where settler mortality was low Europeans
were more likely to settle and construct good institutions.
We estimate Equation (10) using instruments for ln rTW . This estimation strategy
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is valid if all of our instruments work only through current intrinsic trustworthiness.
We think this is a reasonable working hypothesis and, in any case, there is much
precedent for similar strategies in the recent literature.12 As a check, we also include
our instruments one at a time as exogenous regressors (and instruments) in some
specifications.
Table 4 presents the main results. The first column uses ConstraintExec 50 and
Latitude as instruments for rTW ; the second uses ConstraintExec 100 and Latitude.
The results are broadly similar: the log of rTW is highly significant in explaining
y; moreover, the magnitude of the point estimate is quite large. Columns (3) –
(6) include the instruments as regressors one at a time. Trustworthiness is signif-
icant at 5% or better in three of the four cases (and it is almost significant when
ConstraintExec 100 is included). The included instruments are never significant.
The last column uses Mortality as the lone instrument for ln rTW . Again, we see
that trustworthiness is both highly significant and has a large impact on y.13 Living
standards as measured by y are strongly related to our measure of trustworthiness,
no matter which technique we use.
4.4 Structural Estimation
In this section we test to see if there is support for the structure as described by
equations (2), (3), (4), (9), along with (1). These equations show that our mea-
sures of institutions, human capital, and trust should all be determined by intrinsic
trustworthiness.
The first three columns of Table 5 run OLS regressions for trust, institutions, and
12Most of the work on institutions and growth, including Acemoglu et al. (2001); Glaeser et al.
(2004); Hall and Jones (1999); Hausmann et al. (2005), employ a similar assumption.
13The first stages of the IV equations are reasonable. All are significant with one exception,
Latitude when the other instrument is Constraint Exec 100. The adj-R2s are not especially high,
however, and are all around 16%.
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Table 4: Instrumental Variables
Dependent variable: ln y
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
Instruments → CE50
Lat.
CE100
Lat.
CE50,
Lat.
CE100
Lat.
CE50
Lat.
CE100
Lat.
Mort.
lnTrustworthiness
ln rTW
9.54** 9.09** 11.48* 10.82 7.25* 8.14* 11.31**
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.14] [0.03] [0.02] [0.00]
Constraint Exec
50
-0.06
[0.55]
Constraint Exec
100
-0.05
[0.78]
Latitude 0.94 0.48
[0.35] [0.71]
Constant 12.53** 12.52** 13.48** 13.33** 11.36** 11.99** 13.27**
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Observations 48 36 48 36 48 36 24
Prob > F 0.000 0.002 0.007 0.035 0.000 0.004 0.000
Notes: Robust p values in brackets. **significant 1%; * at 5%; + at 10%.
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human capital on ln rTW . In all cases, trustworthiness is significant at the 1% level.
Since we cannot be sure that trustworthiness is exogenous, we also estimate each
specification using Constraint50 – or Constraint100 – and Latitude as instruments
for ln rTW . These results are shown in the last six columns of Table 5. The results
in Columns (4) - (9) confirm that trustworthiness is highly correlated with all three
structural variables. In each case, moreover, the coefficients rise substantially when
we go to IV estimation.
These results support our idea that trust depends on intrinsic trustworthiness.
They are also consistent with the idea that institutions and education are, fundamen-
tally, dependent upon the degree of trustworthiness in society.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we drew a distinction between two types of individuals: the intrinsically
trustworthy and the conditionally trustworthy. The former always honor contracts;
the latter do so only if it is in their self interest. In our view, the proportion of the
intrinsically trustworthy is the key to economic development, better institutions, and
higher per capita income. The greater the fraction of natively trustworthy people, the
greater the output produced and the greater the likelihood that institutions will be
established to encourage conditionally trustworthy individuals to behave in a trust-
worthy manner. As trustworthy behavior grows, so does trust, and output expands
further.
To test our hypotheses we used a new question from the World Values Survey
to measure intrinsic trustworthiness. This question elicits the respondent’s feeling
about the importance of a particular quality – “tolerance and respect for others” –
out of a list of 10 such qualities. Using this as a proxy for intrinsic trustworthiness,
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we found that it was highly significant in explaining per capita income in a wide
variety of specifications. In particular, it outperformed trust (measured by the usual
question from the World Values Survey) when the two were in the same regression.
In addition to treating intrinsic trustworthiness as exogenous, we instrumented for
it using lagged values of an institutional variable, latitude, and European settler
mortality. In all cases, it remained highly significant and its effect was large. We also
tested the structural building blocks of our framework, to see if trust, institutions,
and human capital were determined by intrinsic trustworthiness. We found support
for this idea too, whether we used ordinary least squares or instrumental variables.
The positive contribution of this paper is to point out the importance of trust-
worthiness in society. The formation of trust is clearly important, but it is secondary.
Trust emerges in an environment where there is trustworthy behavior. Whether trust-
worthiness is cultivated through institutions that discourage cheating or through the
promotion of innate or cultural traits, does not matter. Trustworthy behavior is
paramount. We leave as an open question the sources of intrinsic trustworthiness.
Institutions and human and physical capital are essential for economic development,
but the importance of trustworthiness in production and exchange cannot be overem-
phasized. We hope to encourage further theoretical and empirical research on this
topic.
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